Introduction This tenth anniversary issue of the journal Defence and Peace
Economics represents an important occasion for both looking back over the last decade and looking forward over possible future developments for the field of defense economics and of peace studies. In this paper we will consider arms races from this perspective, examining the changing nature of arms races and their impacts on arms expenditure and international stability, comparing and contrasting global and local arms races, and discussing important unanswered modeling questions related to arms races. We will attempt in a relatively short paper to provide an overview of the topic of arms races, followed by gaps in the literature and profitable directions for future research, as requested by the Editors of this special issue.
Definition of the Arms Race and Related Issues/Questions
We start by defining an arms race as the competitive, resource constrained, dynamic process of interaction between two states or coalitions of states in their acquisition of weapons. Such arms race phenomena have been known in virtually all recorded history. Arms races 2 were certainly known to the ancient Greeks and Romans. The Greeks built fleets in the Persian Wars and the Romans in the Punic Wars. In this century there was the naval arms race prior to World War I and the EastWest arms race of the Cold War. Today there are various regional arms build ups, some of which are arms races. Until the East-West arms race of the Cold War period, most arms races were naval. There are several reasons. First, aircraft did not exist until the twentieth century. Second, until the twentieth century, armies were highly labor intensive institutions with relatively little capital. Roman soldiers furnished their own equipment until the late Republic. Feudal levies also furnished their own equipment, where the obligation of a fief holder under military tenure was to furnish a certain number of knights and men at arms for a given number of days a year and to provide arms and horses for these men. The key element in deploying military power at that time was the organization of the state and its ability to raise revenue. The possibility of organizing and disciplining free men to serve as heavy infantry was the key to the Greek and Roman armies. Heavy infantry required a body of free men willing to serve. It is very difficult to find examples of heavy infantry manned by mercenaries until the sixteenth century.
Arms races as exemplified by the accumulation of stocks of weapons represent a very special case of weapons as an instrument of power. We have argued that arms races in the twenty-first century will be very different from the Cold War arms race. One of the things that is different about arms races now is the presence of increasing returns in the production of weapons. Further, the presence of increasing returns to scale in production is reinforced by the fact that software, microelectronics, and information are becoming increasingly important 3 components of modern weapons systems. A thirty-year old airframe with modern electronics, software, and computers can dominate a modern airframe with antiquated equipment.
Constant or increasing returns to scale have always created difficulties for economic theory. An economy with constant returns to scale is indeterminate with respect to the scale size of firms, and it is necessary to appeal to some fixed factor to determine the size of the economy. Increasing returns to scale leads to monopolies constrained only by demand. Behavior then becomes strategic and none of the standard welfare theorems that hold in competitive markets apply. Thus, it is not surprising that increasing returns to scale in an arms race leads to very different results than constant or decreasing returns to scale. 
Impacts of Recent Changes on Stability
These changes in arms races over the last decade have had important impacts on the stability of both the regional and global systems. As a result of these changes, we believe that there are probably greater instabilities today than those of the earlier Cold War period. Yet another threat to stability in the post-Cold War world is that of terrorists using various weapons of mass destruction. Subnational groups, motivated by extreme ideologies, religious fanaticism, or other causes, have much greater access to such weapons on world markets. Large urban 7 centers and freedoms of speech, travel, assembly, and the press have made modern societies highly vulnerable to possible terrorist attack.
The Future of Arms Race Theory
The classic Richardson model of arms races has dominated the theoretical work on this topic. In our own work, both individually and jointly, we have expanded this model to deal with the realities of arms races. It was necessary for us to start from the foundations of why nations would seek weapons and how wars do occur in order to develop a theory that would take account of behavioral decisions of defense decision makers seeking either to deter or to attack the other side. Our work in reformulating the Richardson model with a theoretical foundation has addressed such factors as maximizing behavior, bureaucratic decision making, alliance formation, multicountry stability, the balance of power, and proliferation. Our dynamic-economic model of the arms race has four components: a technology that describes the economic constraints faced by the country in terms of choices between consumption and investment in weapons; a defense technology that determines the level of defense capability in terms of the weapons held on both sides; a learning technology that describes how a country updates the information available to it, and a choice function that characterizes the choices made by the country, given the technology and information available to it, such as through the maximization of a utility function. Assuming that the updating process and the choice function are both continuous and that the choice sets are compact (closed and bounded for finite dimensional spaces), then it follows that there exists at least one equilibrium for the arms race, a result that follows from standard results of optimization theory.
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The Richardson model has been the dominant paradigm for both theoretical and empirical studies of the arms race. However the Richardson paradigm may no longer be appropriate. Increasing returns to scale in the technology of arms production, as discussed earlier, and newer types of "smart" weapons that rely heavily on information, electronics, computers, and software, could change the dynamics of the arms race. Since information is a public good in the sense that its marginal cost is zero, producing weapons with a large informational component possibly implies an increasing returns to scale technology.
Recent developments, including the large-scale mergers of armsproducing firms, such as those producing military aircraft, highlight the importance of increasing returns in weapons production as these firms try to establish longer production runs to exploit these economies. Increasing returns technology in arms production, however, has rather different implications than a diminishing returns to scale technology that is typically assumed in economic models of the arms race. Increasing returns technology in an arms race implies there may not be a unique equilibrium.
Rather, there may be multiple stable equilibria. One implication of such multiple stable equilibria is the possibility of a choice between equilibria. Thus, institutions such as arms control agreements that reduce weapons stocks to a lower equilibrium point should be incorporated in the modeling process.
Overall, arms races with increasing returns technology exhibit very different phenomena than those with constant or diminishing returns to scale technology. The assumption of constant or diminishing returns to scale technology results in choices that are marginal, as in the traditional choice between "guns and butter." In an economy where the technology is 9 characterized by increasing returns to scale and information, however, the production possibility set may be non-convex, and the important choices may be discrete. For example, in an arms race with multiple stable equilibria, the choice of equilibrium becomes an important question that may require consideration of the possibilities for arms control. Increasing returns to scale also creates the possibility that trade in weapons may be a Pareto dominant outcome in the arms race, again implying discrete choices.
We believe that much more will have to be done concerning the role of predictions or projections that each side in an arms race makes as to the opponent's changes in weapons stocks. It is necessary to investigate whether such predictions make an arms race more or less stable, and it will probably be necessary to bring to bear on this question some of the newer results of game theory, such as rational learning, subjective games, and evolutionary games. The behavioral assumption used in our early reformulations of the Richardson model that both countries behave in a myopic manner, without extrapolating changes in weapons stocks, made it easy to analyze the stability of the equilibrium. Under this assumption there exists an equilibrium level of armaments that is stable, while the disarmed state is unstable except under some very special circumstances in which behavior very similar to that of the Prisoner's Dilemma game will be observed. The assumption of myopic behavior is, however, very unrealistic. Clearly, military expenditures are based not only on the current arms level of the potential enemy but also on its projected levels.
A more realistic assumption would treat each country as using information about the current arms level and its rate of change to predict future levels. This projection, that can be revised periodically or continuously, would then be used to plan current weapons acquisitions.
Important recent developments in game theory, such as rational learning, subjective games, and evolutionary games, would permit the study of such issues. Much of this recent work uses repeated games with a finite strategy space. There are two changes that must be made to the basic model to use these results. First, the choice set of the players must be discrete. In the context of the arms race, this assumption is, in fact, more realistic than the previous assumption that the choice set is continuous
The other limitation of these models is that they are not Markov games and thus do not permit stocks. This is a more serious problem in that stocks appear to be an essential element of an arms race. The question is then whether the model can be reformulated in a fashion that is meaningful and yet permits one to use these new results.
If the parties of an arms race are Cournot/Nash players in that they are myopic with respect to the behavior of the other party, then they take this behavior as given. We have shown that in this case the dynamic equations for the arms race are given by generalized nonlinear
Richardson-type equations that have a stable equilibrium. The nature of this equilibrium depends crucially on whether it is stable or not, and we have determined sufficient conditions for an equilibrium to be stable. To do so, it is necessary to specify how each of the two countries will react when the weapon stocks are not in equilibrium. The simplest assumption is that of myopic behavior, where each country reacts only to the current levels of weapons stock, disregarding information about the history of the levels of weapon stocks and the current rate of investment in weapons. that capital in weapons is putty-putty. The assumption that the choice set is discrete is not a serious issue as there is no limit to how fine the choice set need be. The defense budget could be specified to the nearest dollar. Thus, for any game with a bounded continuous choice set, there exists an equivalent game with a discrete choice set that approximates it.
The assumption of no income effects is less innocuous, yet this is an assumption that is commonly used in the cost-benefit and applied public finance literature. It is impossible, for example, to use consumer surplus unless a dollar is a dollar for everyone. The assumption of putty-putty capital is one that has been common in capital theory, and our conjecture is that this is not a very serious restriction in the proposed new paradigm for the arms race. Increasing returns to scale and the special role of information in weapons technology imply that it will be necessary to go beyond marginal analysis in the allocation of resources in acquiring or transferring weapons.
Overall, recent results from the theory of repeated games may provide the needed foundation for a new paradigm for the arms race for the twenty-first century in much the same way that the Maximum Principle and dynamic games provided a way of taking Richardson's equations from a heuristic explanation to a well-developed theoretical model that reflected the conditions of the twentieth century.
Conclusion
Overall, a great amount of work has been done in furthering our knowledge of arms races, but much remains to be done. Future work should extend insights into the nature of arms races and determine the nature of the interactions among the nations involved. In this paper we have defined the arms race and discussed related issues and questions; treated the changing nature of arms races in the last ten years; identified areas of both continuity and change in regional arms races; suggested that the implications of these changes has probably been greater instability than that of the earlier Cold War period; and, finally, discussed some gaps in the literature and some possible future theoretical developments for this subject. Of the possible future developments in this area, we believe that the most important are probably the applications of some of the recent developments in game theory such as rational learning, subjective games, and evolutionary games.
